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Action Research• 
Roberto Albano  
Università di Torino 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The term “action research” covers a variety of disparate approaches to 
investigation and methodology. Aside from the cases where it is nothing 
more than a convenient label, and all the rage for a certain period, action 
research has been the name applied to every attempt to find a method 
contemplating theory and practice as the twin elements of a recursive 
process, as opposed to the “traditional separation between research (which 
has its own methods) and the possible effects of the results of research on a 
given situation” (Capecchi, 2006: 1). An ambitious goal, which has often 
ended in substantial failure. The term is not exclusive to organizational 
research nor, for that matter, did it originate there. We find it in many other 
fields of empirical research: social, psychological and psychopedagogical. 
The underlying principle, consisting of the idea that we can truly know a 
situation only by modifying it, was systematically introduced for the first 
time in the Forties by Kurt Lewin and his associates at MIT’s Center for 
Group Dynamics. In a paper published in 1946, a year before his death, the 
German psychologist, who had become an American citizen in 1940, 
presented his action research methodology.  
In sociology, a debate has been going on since its origins about the 
necessary but problematic link between knowledge objectives and change 
objectives. However, when we speak of action research, even in the broad 
sense as we intend to do here, we refer to practices to investigation and 
methodological proposals that regard this link as indissoluble, and thus deny 
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the distinction between basic research and applied research. “As Kurt Lewin 
has noted: ‘[action research uses] a spiral of steps, each of which is composed 
of a circle of planning, action, and fact-finding about the results of the action’. 
This type of research functions only if close collaboration between the 
different types of actors in the process of research and action takes place” 
(Capecchi, 2008: 20). Spreading in the economically more developed 
countries as a reaction to forms of social research that draw a sharp line 
between theoretical abstraction and intervention in the real world, action 
research has now struck root around the world, and has become particularly 
well established in Latin America in recent years, as the 2005 International 
Journal of Action Research monographic issue shows. Among social research 
methodologists, Johann Galtung has been a leading exponent of action 
research. In the late Sixties, after a rigorously quantitative background 
training with Paul F. Lazarsfeld’s “language of variables”, Galtung presented 
his program for “alternative sociology”, which he was to develop in the 
following decade (1977). The cornerstones of this alternative sociology 
include research “with” people rather than “on” people, open 
communication between researchers and research “object” instead of the 
standardized questionnaire, and research goals focusing on the growth of 
democracy and political consciousness.  
In Italy, the most systematic contribution of general sociology on the 
relationship between research and transformation of social reality has been 
that made by Gian Antonio Gilli. This Author outlines a methodological 
framework based on the following cornerstones: “a) a cognitive activity of 
analysis and reflection, b) which takes place in practice, c) addresses an actual 
practical problem and d) precedes a specific intervention in the real world” (Gilli, 
1971: 14). This is a framework to which he assigns no particular label; Gilli’s 
goal is in any case to offer a general methodology (“How to do research” is 
the ambitious title), in a radical break with the traditional view of research, 
taught in universities and which “often does not take place in social practice 
(point b), but in libraries and institutes; even more often, it does not address 
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a real problem (point c), and almost never has intervention in the real world 
as its actual objective (point d)” (Gilli, 1971: 14). 
To remain in the area of social research methods, Vittorio Capecchi 
sees action research as a “methodological stream” whose distinctive feature 
lies in the fact that “it more clearly expresses the character of intervention 
that sociological research can have” (Capecchi, 1985: 145). He includes the 
studies of social movements carried out by Touraine and coworkers (1984) in 
this stream, as well as the “co-research” conducted by the Quaderni Rossi 
group and the “internal mobilization research” supported and performed by 
certain labor union groups with the help of politically engaged researchers 
and academics. These latter examples lead us directly to organizational 
studies, the area that concerns us more directly here. 
Much attention has been devoted to the relationships between 
organizational theory, research and action in work organizations by the vast 
majority of the schools of thought and disciplines that deal with organization 
in any way. In this area, more than in others, there has always been a 
particular inclination towards applied research, whose main objective is thus 
what is useful, as opposed to basic research which is concerned primarily 
with the truth. This is demonstrated by the fact that it is precisely in the 
organizational arena that we find such a wealth of methodological 
approaches that attempt to bring theory, research and practice together: 
organizational research on the one hand, design, change and evaluation on 
the other. 
In a stricter sense, the term action research chiefly designates the work 
begun towards the mid-Forties by a multidisciplinary group of British 
researchers who were later to found the Tavistock Institute for Human 
Relations in London. The birth of organizational action research in Great 
Britain is contemporary of Lewin’s proposal. Unlike the latter, however, it is 
not rooted in social and experimental psychology, but in psychoanalysis and 
social psychiatry; later, its original biomedical background and interest in 
small groups dynamics was to be extended to the social and psychological 
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disciplines and to wider social systems (Susman, Evered, 1978: 587; Butera, 
1980: 48). 
In Italy, a large number of action research projects, including some 
differing in orientation from the Tavistock approach, were carried out in 
industry during the Seventies, largely in response to the bitter conflicts that 
arose in that period between employers and workers’ unions. More or less at 
the same time, and in some cases even before, at the end of the Sixties, 
institutes and centers for action research came into being (Studio Staff, Rso, 
etc.). Some of these are still operating nowadays, mostly as consulting and 
training centers. Today’s panorama is also made up of groups and 
foundations that were established later, but to some extent draw on the 
heritage of the experience gained in the Seventies. 
In a broader sense, the locution “action research” tends to overlap 
with others that designate more or less contiguous approaches such as “the 
‘cooperative research’ put forward by Lippitt and Lippitt (1978), Whyte’s 
‘participatory action research’ (1991) which follows the socio-technical model 
of humanization of work organizations, the ‘action science’ promoted by 
Argyris, Putnam and Smith (1985) as part of process consulting, the 
‘empowerment’ discussed by Rappaport, Swift and Hess (1984) which aims 
at enhancing actors’ individual capabilities, Touraine’s (1984) ‘intervention 
sociologique’, ‘sociodrama’, and so forth” (Gobo, 2001: 21). The list, which 
would not be complete without the “analyse strategique” developed by 
Crozier and Friedberg (1977), could be much longer; briefly browsing the 
web turns up an entire archipelago of centers, literatures and methods for 
which it is enormously difficult to provide an exhaustive and detailed 
picture (which is not the aim of this paper). 
These brief and altogether incomplete notes on the history of 
organizational thought should be sufficient to show that we would not be 
justified in assigning an overly restricted meaning to the term “action 
research”. On the other hand, setting a few limits on the concept’s extension 
should help us avoid the risk of blurring any and all distinction between 
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action research and applied research (the latter term, moreover, applies to 
the overwhelming majority of organizational studies), or of confusing it with 
other ways of intervening in organizational processes from outside, and in 
particular the consulting activities of experts in a number of disciplines 
(management, psychology, ergonomics, etc.). 
According to Grandori (1996: 8), action research, to be considered as 
such, must have at least the following three characteristics: 
- a close link between theory and practice, such as to lead to an epistemology 
of knowing by transforming and vice versa. 
- a participatory approach, in the sense that producing knowledge capable of 
actually impacting organizational practice calls for pursuing active 
cooperation on the part of the subjects (the research “objects”) in all stages of 
research, rather than attempting to minimize their influence on the research 
design. 
- participation extended to all levels: to the “bottom” as well as the “top” of 
the organization; action must also touch on the overall design and the forms 
by which organizational processes are governed and regulated. 
We can take these three general properties as our starting point for 
drawing the boundaries of action research. On the other side, they are not in 
themselves sufficient, as the link between theory and practice has historically 
been addressed from different epistemological stances. The very concept of 
“participation” can be defined in many ways (see Ceri, 1996), partly as a 
consequence of the underlying cognitive perspective. To shed light on the 
different views of action research, we must thus start from the theory of 
knowledge and the methodology of the social and human sciences. In 
particular, we must scrutinize the relationship between the research activity 
in all its stages and the investigated social/cultural system: in other words, 
with the lexicon widespread in the literature, between researcher and the 
“object” of research. This relationship has always been a central theme of 
methodological thinking in the social sciences and in the human sciences; 
this is easily understandable, as we are dealing here with entities that are 
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“cut from the same cloth”: the object has cognitive capacity, feels emotions, 
makes choices on the basis of his or her values, exactly like the researchers. 
This aspect can be seen as a source of noise, to be held in check, or, 
conversely, as a essential element to be made the most of. 
In standard methodological texts, the relationship between researcher 
and object of research is traditionally discussed in terms of the debate that for 
over a century has pitted objectivists (or positivists, including neo- and post-
positivism) against subjectivists (or interpretivists). Simplifying drastically, 
there are two traditional solutions to the problem of the researcher-object 
relationship: we can label them as the naturalist solution, stemming from the 
objectivist roots, and the double hermeneutic solution adopted by subjectivism. 
Diverse as they are, they have the “researcher-object” dualism in common. 
Alongside these two ideal-types (in the Weberian sense of the term), 
we can identify a further two, less common in the methodological literature, 
but important for the understanding of action research, as they attempt to 
move past this dualism. The first, which we call the synthetic recomposition, is 
a solution still rooted in subjectivism, and is in a certain sense its “extreme 
consequence”. The second, which we call analytical recomposition, is 
conceivable only in opposition to the objectivism vs. subjectivism dichotomy, 
and thus treads the epistemological “third way”. 
 
Dualist views of the researcher-object relationship 
In the mid-nineteenth century, methodological thinking began to be 
applied to the cultural and social aspects of human conduct. The positivists, 
Comte and Spencer first and foremost, took the more developed sciences – 
physics, chemistry, biology – as models, in particular as regards their 
empirical methods and epistemological principles. Social phenomena are 
thus to be considered as objective facts, whose measurement and analysis, 
likewise objective, are tasks to be accomplished by a researcher located 
“outside” the situation being examined; the researcher, freed from the 
prejudices and categories of common sense, is then able to understand the 
 
7 
essential aspects of reality, both in descriptive terms and in terms of causal 
explanation, where science casts anchor. Individual motivations and reasons 
are not needed, except in purely ancillary fashion, to explain social facts. 
Durkheim (1897) applied this principle rigorously in his celebrated study of 
suicide: he stated that the subjectivity underlying this dramatic decision 
serves to the social research only in order to identify different types of 
suicide, which then must be explained with objective procedures of causal 
imputation, finding constraining social factors that are beyond the 
individual’s will. The naturalist solution to the researcher-object relationship 
thus consists in that: the former’s point of view prevail completely, at least at 
the moment of explanation, i.e. the moment that sets scientific research apart 
from other types of research or thinking about human doings. 
Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, the naturalist solution 
was countered by what we have termed the double hermeneutic solution. 
This was part of a more general anti-positivist reaction, the contributions to 
which were in fact quite heterogeneous in nature; nevertheless they shared 
the following broad characteristics: 
- the categorical rejection of the methodological monism advocated by the 
positivists; 
- the idea that the aims of the cultural sciences are predominately 
idiographic, i.e., oriented towards the detailed reconstruction of individual 
cases, as opposed to the aims of the natural sciences, which are to formulate 
general laws; 
- the strong emphasis given to the intentionality of social actors and the 
“internal” determinants of action (attitudes, values, beliefs, etc.): in short, to 
the understanding of historico-social phenomena.  
Here, the separation between researcher and object becomes a 
particularly problematic issue. The actors, individual and collective, who are 
the object of research, are embedded in a system of contingent action, of 
which they have a vision peculiar to themselves, pre-reflexive and ingenuous 
(Sparti, 1995: 109). The first level interpretations, made by the participants in 
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the system, are distinct from the second level interpretations developed by 
those who approach the system from outside: this is especially true if the 
outsider is a researcher who adopts the specialized conceptual categories and 
linguistic expressions of a scientific community. The first level interpretations 
are constitutive of reality: while acting, the actor monitors his action, 
describes it and interprets it with his own cultural tools, modifying his action 
accordingly or, often unintentionally, changing the conditions of his action. 
At the time the researcher interacts with the object, with his alterity he also 
contributes to the “construction” of the empirical basis. The researcher 
adopts an outside viewpoint, thinking, speaking and writing accounts with a 
language that differs from that of the object: hence the double hermeneutic. If 
we prefer, we can also refer to this dualism with the distinction “emic/etic”, 
terms first used in linguistics and anthropology in the 1950s and that have 
now entered the lexicon of the other social sciences (a synthetic overview of 
the debate is in Nigris, 2001). 
In brief, the “emic” (which derives from phonemic) perspective is 
rooted in interpretative categories that are meaningful to the insiders, the 
native members of a society who are the sole judges of their validity. The 
“etic” (from phonetic) perspective is based on assumptions, concepts and 
statements that are meaningful for a researcher and his scientific community. 
The interpretations that the researcher provides for the events, acts or 
cultural processes which he investigates must be “returned” and compared 
with the point of view of the insiders: in any case, the researcher must be able 
to maintain balance between being an outsider and familiarity with the 
object, between involvement and detachment; to cite Fred Davis’ metaphor, 
he must be both “Martian” and “Convert” at one and the same time, 
although there is no simple way to reconcile or resolve the contradictions of 
these two ontological polarities (Davis, 1973: 342). 
After outlining the fundamental differences between these two 
solutions, it is worth considering a couple of their shared characteristics. The 
first is that the researcher and the object of research have clearly distinct 
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identities, roles, reference groups and conceptual and interpretative schemes. 
In both cases, there is a separation between the observer and the process 
observed, between the outsider’s interpretation and that (or those) of the 
insiders. There can be no doubt that this separation has different implications 
in the two perspectives. In the naturalist solution, it is a problem only to the 
extent that the alterity of the researcher and his tools for observing and 
investigating reality rises significant perturbations of the observed reality. It 
is thus a problem that takes on importance in specific situations, and that can 
in principle be solved. Indeed, there is a plethora of studies and 
methodological solutions addressing the problem of data “truthfulness”: 
once an objective reality is postulated, it is necessary to find appropriate 
techniques for neutralizing the many sources of distortion that can be 
activated, even unconsciously, when collecting data. 
In the double hermeneutic solution, by contrast, the researcher-object 
dualism is a problem that is more than just technical and contingent, but a 
sort of ontological and epistemological paradox: on the one hand, it is 
precisely the subjective viewpoints of the object that are solicited by the 
researcher in order to reconstruct and comprehend the logic underpinning a 
given situation “from inside”; on the other hand, “the journey through the 
actors’ inner experience is not enough. It is also necessary that the analyst be 
able to interpret the material and the accounts he collects” (Friedberg, 1993: 
303). 
How can we explain the meaning of the objects’ actions, a meaning 
that is deeply embedded in everyday actions and constructed in the action, in 
order to transmit it to the researcher’s scientific community or to others who 
are outside the reality that is being investigated? How can we reconcile the 
need to become familiar with the object’s life-worlds and to grasp the 
authenticity of the social practices, the beliefs and the representations of the 
values and the symbols of the insiders’ culture, with the fact that a 
researcher’s intrusion in their everyday life undermines this authenticity? 
And again, starting from Gadamer’s thesis, inspired by sociolinguistics, that 
 
10 
the use of a given language influences the perception and interpretation of 
reality: how can we reconcile the researcher’s need to communicate with his 
scientific community, using its language, with the fact that the insiders’ 
language is completely different? How can we translate the elements of the 
investigated culture into the language of research, without necessarily 
coming into conflict with the insiders’ description and interpretation of 
reality? If observed reality is socially constructed, the language used for this 
construction is fundamental: the researcher’s re-construction of reality is only 
one of the many possible re-constructions after the fact, not even the most 
authentic or the most adequate. 
This problem could be examined in much greater depth, as could the 
various approaches to find a solution for it, but for our purposes it is 
sufficient to say that what we call the double hermeneutic solution is an 
invitation to focus on the researcher’s intrinsic ambivalence towards the 
object, seeking to strike a balance between familiarity and outsideness. The 
relationship between researcher and object is an unceasing interweaving of 
questions and responses, of descriptions and interpretations. The researcher 
who was there at a given moment, not only must obtain validation for his 
interpretations from his scientific community (or communities), but he must 
also solicit backtalk from the natives: their opinions of his interpretations. It is 
a (virtually) endless dialogue, where the truth is only a limit-concept, 
because, in its most genuine form, “the hermeneutic perspective favors the 
inexhaustibility of meanings, the limitless productivity of interpretations” 
(Montesperelli, 1998: 25). 
The second characteristic shared by the two solutions, and which is 
closely linked to the first, is that the relationship between researcher and 
object is not one between peers: it is the researcher who for the most part sets 
the rules of the game, planning the research on the basis of his own scholarly 
interests or his interpretation of the knowledge needs of the sponsors on 
whose behalf the research is done. The object, for his part, can only choose 
between complete acceptance of the rules, or refusing to cooperate. Certainly, 
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the rules can be very different: they can provide a greater or lesser degree of 
discretion and room for manouvre by the players, and this does not depend 
only on whether the orientation is naturalist or hermeneutic, but on a host of 
other factors as well, including the type of questions the research seeks to 
answer, the tools that will be adopted for collecting and analyzing data, and 
the constraints and resources for research. In very general terms, research 
conducted according to these two orientations involves the following stages:  
- research planning: sponsorship or self-sponsorship, specifying general 
goals, finding resources; 
- research design: identifying theoretical and conceptual frameworks, units of 
analysis, tools for collecting and analyzing data, preparing the setting, etc.; 
- fieldwork, collecting data, texts and information in general; 
- organizing, analyzing, describing and interpreting data; 
- editing the research report for the natives; 
- defining the plan of action and the changes to be made to the examined 
activities; 
- monitoring and evaluating the changes that were introduced. 
The fact that the stages of the research process in the naturalist 
solution are strictly sequential, with little feedback (feedback is concentrated 
after analysis, when information has already been collected), and that, by 
contrast, the double hermeneutic solution involves ample feedback between 
all the stages (Cardano, 2003: 35), should not distract us from a far more 
substantial aspect that both solutions have in common: it is chiefly the 
researcher, someone outside the investigated system of action and meanings, 
who sets the goals, the rules, the times and places of the game, or, to put it in 
more technical terms, the research design. 
 
Bridging the separation 
As we mentioned earlier, a number of different proposals have been 
formulated regarding the relationship between researcher and object, though 
they are rarely addressed in standard methodological manuals. These 
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proposals vary widely, though they all at least in principle call into question 
the separation between researcher and object and the latter’s subordination 
to the former in the cognitive process. Though their methods and outcomes 
are highly dissimilar, they aim to the bridging of the divide or, if we prefer, 
to go beyond the dualism, affirming that there is autonomy on the part of the 
object of research. Here again, we must simplify drastically, reducing an 
extensive methodological debate, and an even broader variety of research 
practices, to two ideal-types. 
The first alternative to the classic solutions, which we can call synthetic 
recomposition, still stems from the anti-positivist reaction: it thus sees reality 
as a social construct, whose meaning must be decoded starting from the 
actors’ subjectivity. But instead of considering the tension between alterity 
and familiarity as inevitable, it seeks a radical solution to the dualism. As can 
be logically expected, however, it does so in a very different manner from 
that of the naturalist solution: if the latter assigns priority to the etic and to a 
researcher outside the object, synthetic recomposition is predominantly 
based on self-analysis of the subjective experiences of the participants in a 
group, movement, organization, etc. 
A second type, which we call analytical recomposition, rejects the 
concrete separation between the professional researcher and the object of 
research, but acknowledges the importance of the various forms of knowing: 
not only the coded forms, but also those that are tacit or produced in the 
course of the processes that are being analyzed. The epistemological 
framework underlying this approach is entirely different from those we have 
considered so far: a third way, less traveled than the objectivist and 
subjectivist paths, but nevertheless far from being a newcomer to social and 
philosophical thinking. To stay within the purview of the modern social 
sciences, this way of dealing denies the opposition between explanation and 
understanding, as it regards them as complementary parts of the same 
cognitive process. This perspective can also be found in the thinking of 
authors such as John Stuart Mill and Georg Simmel who are in general 
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considered as advocates of the other approaches. Above all, however, it is in 
Max Weber’s ponderous methodology (Methodenlehre) that it shows its full 
dignity and independence from the other conceptions (Maggi, 1997; Sciolla, 
2002). We will now look at the two approaches to recomposition in greater 
detail. 
Synthetic recomposition springs from the rejection of the external 
researcher’s ambivalence regarding the object, rather than making it a part of 
the process of interpretation. At most, understanding the object entails 
“being” like the object, identifying with it completely: either because the 
researcher has been like the object for some time, or because he has 
undergone a process of “conversion” to being a member of the community of 
insiders (“going native”, as anthropologists say). Even without reaching 
these extremes, we can say that the researcher must at least be “on the side” 
of the object and adopt, at least for the duration of the research, the object’s 
point of view, both in terms of values and from the cognitive standpoint. 
Here there is no problem of cultural mediation, of translating the language 
spoken by the natives into the language of a scientific community: the 
researcher acts as a facilitator for dialogue between the insiders, so that an 
authentic and adequate interpretation of the situation can emerge from their 
own exchanges. There is only one hermeneutic register: backtalk becomes a 
member validation test, inasmuch as it is the insiders who are the possessors 
of the knowledge that can provide valid interpretations. Likewise, the object 
must reject his submission to research institutions, becoming independent 
and self-sufficient in doing research on himself. Research is conducted in a 
new area of dialogue, facilitated by the researcher, which permits self-
analysis of subjective experience and makes it possible to reflect collectively 
on the doings of the group and community. Research approaching this ideal-
type can be found in anthropology and in social psychology, in studies of 
cultures and of religious movements, as well as those of employees’ health at 
the workplace. We can also call this the recomposition of the researcher-
activist, as what is at stake here are the relationships of domination and the 
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attempt to redefine them, or overturn them, through political action and 
social participation. 
At the origin, the researcher thus has a function in revealing the 
object’s passivity and subordination, his contradictions. The object, in order 
to become an object for himself, must acquire independence, avoid 
delegating powers to the research specialists. Once this awareness has been 
achieved, one’s current situation and the possible changes must be analyzed 
without relying on academic and traditional schema; it is through an analysis 
of everyday experience that the system (work organization, community, etc.) 
takes shape. Recomposition between researcher and object coincides with the 
formation of a more authentic, less forced, viewpoint, a calling into question 
of the existing relationships of power and domination, usually in favor of a 
subordinate collective subject.  
To give an idea, and with no claim to representativity, we will quote a 
brief passage from one of the major manuals in which the researcher is seen 
as a specialist who is called upon to take sides; to choose the progressist side: 
“Being objective does not, as is commonly believed, mean seeing things from 
a point of view that is neutral, and thus acceptable to everyone: being 
objective means considering reality from the point of view of the historically 
progressive class, the class that in that particular moment of history, is the 
most advanced part of the productive forces. Here lies the lack of objectivity, 
and hence the unscientific nature of current sociology: not in the fact that it 
takes the side of the dominant class [...] but in the fact that the class whose 
side it takes is no longer, and has long ceased to be, a progressive class” 
(Gilli, 1971: 29). 
We now come to the other way of moving beyond the researcher-
object dualism. In this case, the starting point is neither an objectivist view or 
a subjectivist view. Social reality, from this standpoint, is not made up of 
discrete “entities” of various kinds – institutions, individual actors, collective 
actors, actions, life-worlds and so forth; it is conceived in terms of acting, 
becoming, continuity, process, change. Consequently, social reality is not 
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known either through objective outside research practices that can be 
standardized in protocols, or by analyzing the subjective experiences of the 
individuals who are the object of the research. In this view, producing 
scientific knowledge about a given system of social relations (including, but 
not limiting to, an organized work situation) always entails building 
synergies between different forms of knowledge. Consequently, this 
approach does not deny the validity of knowledge organized in disciplines, 
or in a systematic corpus drawn from concrete processes of action. Nor is 
anyone required to “convert” or espouse ideologies, much less teleological 
views of the course of human history. To avoid terminological ambiguity, it 
is advisable in this case to abandon the concrete distinction between 
researcher and object of research, in favor of a analytical distinction between 
two processes that flow together into a single activity: research and the 
primary process on which research tries to shed light. Both are processes 
organized by bounded rationality, which at a certain point meet each other. 
From this perspective, action research is participated in, always and 
especially, by those who are involved in the process, and the latter’s 
boundaries are not fixed and preordered. Disciplinary knowledge, which is 
useful in decoding the surrounding situation, can even be acquired through 
self-training alone, and thus without the help of outside experts. In practice, 
this is a difficult route to take in the current social division of work, which is 
in turn the result of many conflicts of varying kinds: of gender, of class, 
political, ethnic, and so on. Here, researcher-object recomposition takes place 
primarily at the level of the knowledge and technical skills involved in 
carrying out the activities: knowledge organized systematically in 
disciplines, which can be transferred, and the skills produced and possessed 
by the subjects acting in the examined process, which are largely non-
transferrable. These types of knowledge, in a relational conception of social 
reality, are complementary: they are not synthesized in, or reduced to, a 
single knowledge, and they can be reconciled only in a setting of dialogue, 
characterized by a method of analysis capable of breaking down actual social 
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processes into elements that are only analytically distinct. For analytic 
recomposition, in any case, it is not even necessary that those who exercise 
the profession of researcher relinquish their role. The fact that recomposition 
takes place at the level of various types of knowledge does not in concrete 
terms mean that the ways research is conducted are predetermined; in the 
research design, it is important to bear in mind that an important part of the 
competences needed to interpret the process are possessed by the subjects 
who participate in it, and cannot be in any way coded, extracted and 
transferred to other outside subjects. Each time, it will be necessary to 
identify the empirical solutions for coordinating and establishing dialogue 
between the various types of knowledge held by different subjects: task 
forces, staff members, self-training and research groups, etc. 
 
Action research in organizational settings according to the various 
solutions 
We will now return to the topic of action research, connecting it with 
the epistemological alternatives for studying organizational action, and 
specifically to the solutions we have just outlined for the researcher-object 
relationship.  
This choice clearly entails rejecting the notion that action research 
involves opting for a specific, anti-positivist epistemological conception 
(Susman, Evered, 1978). Our approach enables us to consider a large variety 
of methodological stances which have paid close attention to the relationship 
between theory and practice, at the same time providing criteria for 
interpreting this variety and which can also be used in part to evaluate each 
single proposal. 
 
Action research with the naturalist solution 
In the naturalist solution, we see a researcher at work who looks at the 
organized system as an object which is to a large extent predetermined by its 
designer. In this case, action research is a special form of consulting, 
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provided to a client made up of a plurality of actors who in some way 
exercise a decision-making power in the organization and who expect the 
researcher to bring together different points of view under the aegis of 
scientific analysis. The researcher-consultant’s first task is thus to define a 
shared value framework. Consequently, he takes the criteria and schema for 
describing and interpreting the situation under examination from his 
baggage of theoretical knowledge and field experience. By contrast with 
more “traditional” consulting, there is an attempt in this case to obtain as 
much cooperation as possible from the client (i.e., the plurality of actors) in 
all stages of the research, starting from the time data and information are 
collected. The diagnostic stage is followed by the stages of planning, 
executing and evaluating the action: all stages in which the researcher-
consultant is fully involved, coordinating research activities and the 
synthesis of the findings. In action research with a naturalist orientation, the 
researcher-consultant thus solves problems, identifies alternative practical 
solutions and makes decisions about the change to be made, listening to 
input from the various parties involved (those in executive roles, 
management, union organizations, etc.) and keeping them informed at all 
times. If necessary, the researcher can leverage his reputation to offer himself 
as a negotiator between conflicting parties.  
Preferably, the research design is experimental or quasi-experimental, 
with a “before” and an “after”: between the two stages, the organizational 
variables are manipulated, with the researcher monitoring. The vantage 
point is still that of someone outside the process: to implement a before-after 
experimental design, or a surrogate thereof, it is necessary to have an 
objective knowledge of the “before”, isolate one or more of its variables and 
manipulate them to produce the “after”. In this solution, action research’s 
aim is not only to solve the sponsor’s problems, but also to produce findings, 
or in other words scientific propositions and laws that can be generalized 
and added to the earlier substantive theoretical frameworks of the social 
sciences, which thereby acquire the capacity to explain and predict. 
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Of the many initiatives with characteristics that approximate this ideal 
type, there can be no doubt that one of the most noteworthy is the action 
research conducted at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. The socio-
technical approach has long been the dominant orientation of organizational 
action research, particularly in the English-speaking countries (see Marchiori, 
2010). In Italy, a large number of studies inspired by this approach were 
conducted in the Seventies. 
 
Action research with the double hermeneutic solution 
In the double hermeneutic solution, the research is once again guided 
by a researcher who is “outside” the system being analyzed, even if he acts 
as a participant observer. The work situation is understood as a psycho-
social reality, constructed by the games of the subjects involved in a myriad 
of everyday interactions. This reality is accessible through subjective 
experiences, made up more from stereotypes, emotions, and moral 
judgments than from cognitive rationality. Reconstructing the games 
between the actors and the rules, which is accomplished by observing and 
listening to those who are directly involved, must take into account with 
impartiality the various standpoints, the different versions. Subsequently, 
this reconstruction is “returned” to the observed subjects, who thus reread 
their everyday experience filtered through the researcher’s experience. This 
should provide the actors in the observed system with a greater 
understanding of the consequences of their conduct, while any shortcomings 
in the researcher’s reconstruction – details, omissions, overestimates, etc. – 
should thus be reported to him. Inasmuch as it is possible, the goal is to 
arrive at a reciprocal clarification of the investigated reality: even though, as 
we have said, the interpretations given by the researcher do not coincide 
with those of the actors participating regularly to the process, such a 
dialogue is considered useful anyway.   
More specifically: “after he has immersed himself in the actors’ 
insideness, the analyst must thus recover an outside point of view without 
 
19 
which he would be unable to arrive at an overall vision of the analyzed space 
of action (...) So as not to betray the spirit of his inductive and clinical 
process, however, he cannot base this outsideness on knowledge or data 
which are outside this space. It is only from the latter that he must draw the 
resources with which he can again find an external point of view” (Friedberg 
1993: 303). Eschewing any form of generalization and classification, the 
researcher does not apply a systematic set of shared interpretative categories: 
strictly speaking, he does not in this case engage in a true “analysis” of the 
empirical material (Maggi, 2003: II, 3; III, 2). If adopted consistently, the 
double hermeneutic solution can only help the individual participant, or the 
small group, to reflect on what has already occurred, but cannot supply 
accurate elements for organizational design. The description is valuable per se 
because it increases the actors’ awareness of the characteristics of the 
empirical system to which they unintentionally give life. We are far from the 
linearity of the naturalist solution’s problem-setting / problem-solving / 
evaluation pattern; the system’s rationality, if we can call it that, is a 
rationality recognizable only ex post facto. 
Also in the double hermeneutic solution, as in naturalist one, action 
research can be a form of consulting (albeit with great difficulty: 
Czarniawska, 2001), which we can call “clinico-therapeutic”. The researcher 
provides aid and/or support to the client, primarily an individual or group 
(generally small in size) of individuals who interact with each other. The 
researcher starts from the assumption that organizational change will be the 
logical outcome of the individuals’ greater awareness of their own and 
others’ problems, of a greater capacity for communication between the 
individuals who everyday interact.  
 
Action research with the solution of synthetic recomposition 
The synthetic recomposition solution rejects the separation of roles 
between those who do research, professionally, and those who are the object 
of research: what we have is not research on the organizational actors, but 
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with them. The researcher is not a participant observer, but rather, a “full 
member” of the social system he has decided to observe (Marzano, 2006: 60). 
At most, in an initial stage when the researcher is still “outside”, he can act as 
a catalyst: even if only though his otherness, he triggers reflexivity in the 
communities of practice. If he has the right skills, he can also play a 
pedagogical and/or political role: this, for example, is contemplated in the 
analysis of social movements through Touraine’s intervention sociologique 
(Touraine et al., 1984). Here, the researcher must ensure that the group 
proceeds with self-analysis of its interactions with other social actors (and in 
particular with antagonists), avoiding stereotyped interpretations and 
gradually becoming aware of its nature as a social movement. In the final 
stage, the “outside” researchers share their interpretations with the “inside” 
researchers, or in other words, the movement’s actors. Melucci (1984), in 
emphasizing the importance of Touraine’s method, also indicates the 
limitations that he feels should be corrected: specifically, the researcher’s 
overly pedagogical-missionary orientation, and the lack of means for 
monitoring the relationship between researcher and actor. We urge the 
reader to devote particular attention to this point, even though it is not 
essential to organizational design. As we see it, it is an excellent example of 
an unavoidable contrast between two epistemological options that, though 
both rooted in subjectivism, are entirely distinct: what from the standpoint of 
the double hermeneutic is a limitation for research, is from the perspective of 
synthetic recomposition an innovative methodological choice, a resource for 
social change. 
To return to the general features of synthetic recomposition, it should 
be added that within this approach in no way action research takes the form 
of an expert consulting. In some cases, training may be provided: the 
researchers translate, avoiding technical jargon, and supply the object with 
insights about the organizational processes and their consequences that they 
have developed in their own disciplines; grafting technico-scientific elements 
onto the actors’ subjectivity, which is and remains the central core for 
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interpreting the activities they perform, produces a greater awareness on the 
part of the operators of the process in which they are involved. To identify 
examples of action research conducted in these way, we can look first to the 
so-called “internal mobilization” studies that began to be promoted in the 
Seventies by certain labor union groups with the help of university 
researchers and research groups devoted to organized work. In internal 
mobilization research, as Capecchi and Pesce (1979) have indicated, “the 
worker becomes the subject of research not so much because he provides 
information directly, but because he is aware of the political purpose of the 
research involving him; because the topics were not primarily or entirely 
identified by the labor union apparatus, but result from a series of struggles, 
tensions, analyses which have already been very clearly expressed by the 
base; because he knows that his judgments will contribute to the union’s 
overall judgment; because he comes into direct contact with experts and 
researchers in a relationship that is no longer one of subordination but of 
comparing different approaches, cultural tools and attitudes”. From the 
Eighties onwards, these studies have continued, addressing other important 
issues – those regarding gender differences in particular – in addition to 
workers’ concerns (Capecchi, 2006: 11). 
In certain significant respects, this ideal-type is approximated also by 
the research carried out by Ivar Oddone, Gastone Marri and several groups 
of unionized workers at Farmitalia and Fiat in the Sixties (Oddone, Re, 
Briante, 1977). In particular, we refer to the contention that only the workers’ 
subjectivity is able to identify a particular group of harmful elements, e.g, 
those that can be specifically attributed to the work organization. As it has 
been pointed out, while workers’ subjectivity was originally the exhaustive 
point of view covering the entire work situation, occupational medicine, with 
its heavily objectivist orientation, later incorporated it in a syncretic 
procedure where “descriptions, opinions and judgments are collected from 
workers, as data to be added to anamnestic data and data about the physical 
environment” (Maggi, 1994/2010). 
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Also worth mentioning is a French approach inspired in part by 
Oddone’s works. The University of Aix-Marseille is home to the 
Département d'Ergologie founded by the philosopher Yves Schwartz. The 
latter has proposed a method for investigating organized work called DD3P: 
“Dispositif Dynamique à Trois Pôles” (Schwartz, 2000). The démarche ergologique 
requires mutual exchange between the pole of organized knowledge and the 
pole of knowledge held by the protagonists of organized activities: the third 
pole, which is that which furthers this “two-way Socratic process”, is not 
theoretical and epistemological in nature, but is a determination to 
encourage intellectual and social encounter, an “activist philosophy that sets 
sail for no particular harbor”(Schwartz, 2000: 719). 
 
Action research with the solution of analytic recomposition 
In the solution of analytic recomposition, research must necessarily be 
both research and action at the same time: a process subject to analysis is 
necessarly subject to change. Research is a reflection about the process, on the 
choices that have currently been made, on their congruency, on the 
consequences for the subjects and on the alternative courses of action. As in 
every rational reflection about a complex system, however, we must be 
provided with tools for analysis, or in other words, key-concepts for 
interpreting the organizational action. The latter cannot be reduced either to 
“ethnomethods” (or the commonsense of the participants in the process) or 
to the models developed by external experts and organizational consultants; 
nor can they be borrowed from one of the many disciplines that deal with the 
technical actions and aims of formal organizations (in health care, education, 
organized labor, law, economics, etc.). What is needed is an interpretative 
schema that springs from an interdisciplinary field, as is organization theory, 
capable of promoting the exchange of knowledge. This type of knowledge, 
theoretical and methodological, is necessary in order to interpret an 
organized process, i.e., to compare it with action alternatives and thus 
evaluate it. 
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But this is not enough on its own. To interpret the process correctly, 
the competences that the subjects have developed in it are also needed. This 
type of knowledge, unlike the previous kind, cannot be transferred. 
Exchanges must thus be promoted between the pole of knowledge organized 
in disciplines and the pole of knowledge possessed (tacitly, for the most part) 
by the subjects who act. The participation of professional researchers is not 
indispensable. What is important is the methodologist, who may, though 
need not necessarily, be a professional researcher, and who helps the subjects 
in the organization to learn about the analysis tools (e.g., through 
appropriate training efforts), or who promotes self-reflection on the part of 
each participant and the exchanges between the process’s subjects. The 
methodologist is not required to appear in any other guise than his own, 
much less mediate between conflicting parties or take one side as opposed to 
another. He can draw information from the research that can be used 
elsewhere, in other processes (for instance, as empirical material for assessing 
the adequacy of the organizational theory and the analysis method deriving 
from it). Concepts and models that are useful for interpreting organizational 
action can be taken from economics, biomedicine, law, the polytechnic 
disciplines, etc. Obviously, this is not knowledge possessed, except to a very 
minor extent, either by the methodologist or by those who work in the 
examined process. 
Who, then, is part of the research group? Various subjects can 
participate in action research of this kind: researchers from universities and 
other institutions, physicians dealing with preventive medicine, engineers, 
labor unionists, and so forth. In any case, the subjects who are involved on a 
daily basis in the process being studied must necessarily be part of the 
research group / project / program. For there to be effective action, there 
must be participation by everyone who has the power to make decisions 
about the design of the organization as a whole, regardless of formally 
assigned authority and responsibilities.  
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We must not, however, think that what has just been said presupposes 
an idyllic vision of the organization: clearly, having criteria for analysis is not 
sufficient to change the current relationships of power and domination. But it 
is just as clear that whoever wishes to propose realistic changes in an 
empirical process must have an interpretative basis enabling him to identify 
the alternatives. 
In action research conducted using this approach, the step following 
analysis consists of introducing changes which result from choices made, at 
least to some extent independently, by the subjects involved in the research. 
These changes will then be evaluated, a step which is nothing less than the 
beginning of a new analysis, and which will disclose new training 
requirements, the further disciplinary knowledge that is needed, and the 
additional stages and portions of the process that must be investigated. 
Training, analysis, action, monitoring and regulation are thus all aspects of a 
complex activity carried out primarily by those involved in the process, who 
may if necessary cooperate with outsiders (trainers, methodologists, labor 
unionists, health and prevention specialists, etc.), none of whom relinquishes 
his professional identity. In any case, for the entire duration of the action 
research, there is no distinction between researcher and object (or between 
consultant and client): the object is the analytical process, the researchers are 
all the concrete subjects who are in any way involved in the action research. 
Precisely because the approach is analytical, it creates confusion to speak of 
recomposition between researcher and object: what is necessary to 
recompose are different types of knowledge, transferrable and non-
transferrable, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, different analytical 
frameworks for the organizational structuration, and the various knowledge 
resulting from specific organizational choices (economic, legal, biomedical, 
etc.). 
An example close to the ideal-type we have just outlined is provided 
by the research and methodological work that has been carried on for the last 
thirty year through the Interdisciplinary Research Program “Organization 
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and Well-Being”, founded and coordinated by Bruno Maggi, and currently 
located at the University of Bologna. Underlying this Program is a 
conception of the organization as a process of decisions and actions based on 
bounded rationality, which can be found in several of the classic texts of 
sociology and organization theory (including Max Weber, Herbert Simon, 
James D. Thompson) and which has served as the foundation for a rich and 
systematic conceptualization which its proponent calls the “Theory of 
Organizational Action” (Maggi, 1984/1990; 2003; Maggi, Albano, 1996). From 
this epistemological-theoretical axis, Maggi has derived his “Method of 
Organizational Congruencies” (Maggi, 1984/1990). Hinging on the concept 
of “organizational constraint”, which in addition to the classic sources we 
have just mentioned also draws on the work of the founder of sociologie du 
travail, Georges Friedmann, the O.C. Method provides a meeting place for all 
of the disciplines that from various viewpoints investigate the complex 
relationship between organizational decisions and the agents’ well-being, 
regarding the latter as an essential aspect for evaluating an organizational 
process. 
Another two important experiences, take an entirely different path 
towards the ideal-type of analytical recomposition. One is that of the Ergape 
team of the de Unité Mixte de Recherche Apprentissage, Didactique, 
Evaluation, Formation, at the University of Aix-Marseille, which studies 
teaching and learning activities in “problematic” classes, analyzing work 
situations with the “Méthode d’Auto-Confrontation”, method proposed by the 
linguist Daniel Faïta (1989) at the end of the 1980s. The method, which builds 
on the notions of “dialogue” and “dialogic relationship” advanced by the 
Bachtin Circle, consists in an examination (‘self-confrontation’) which a 
worker performs of his own activity recorded on video. 
The second experience that should be mentioned is closely linked to 
the first: the “Clinic of activity”, a research group guided by Yves Clot, 
Professor of Work Psychology at CNAM in Paris. These approach starts from 
a sharp distinction between concrete activity and real activity: “what a 
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subject actually does or accomplishes in the course of his activity is a tiny 
portion of that activity (...) The action, the gesture, the choice that one would 
have wanted to make but could not or was not able to make (...), are 
moments of the activity (...) These “suspensions” remain in the subjective 
and collective action as possibilities waiting to be made real” (Scheller, 2006: 
11). 
Here again, the real activity is accessed using the Méthode d’Auto-
Confrontation, but in the “croisée” version (Clot, Faïta, 2000), which further 
increases the potential for accessing the real activity: essentially, the worker’s 
analysis of his recorded activity is reviewed by another expert in the 
situation, for instance a coworker with the same level of experience. The 
addressee of the analysis is thus no longer the researcher: “the words of the 
subject are not directed only towards their object (the visible situation), but 
also towards the activity of those who listen to them” (Clot, 1999: 142). 
Differences and complementarities between the Method of 
Organizational Congruencies and the Méthode d’Auto-Confrontation are 
showed in Faïta, Maggi, 2007. 
 
Conclusions 
We started from three basic characteristics of action research: the close 
link between theory and practice, the participatory nature of the approach, 
and its application to every decision-making level. These aspects are 
important for delimiting the scope of action research, though as we have 
seen, they can take widely divergent forms. On the basis of an extensive 
literature which originated in the 1950s, we can conclude that action research 
does not consist of a specific technique or procedure, and not even of a well 
defined theory of knowledge: it is more correct to acknowledge that different 
ways of viewing action research have been proposed, and attempt to develop 
a typology for interpreting the variability of these proposals. To this end, we 
have considered two dichotomies that generate the attribute space. The first 
regards ”who” is responsible for defining research goals and methods: this 
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may be an observer outside the system of action, in general a professional 
researcher, or it may be the object who does research on itself (perhaps 
involving professional researchers, but always in a relationship between 
peers). 
The second dichotomy, concerning the emic/etic distinction, 
differentiates between two basic interpretative perspectives: that which 
considers only one of these two poles to be appropriate and exhaustive, and 
that which seeks to combine the knowledge produced in the process with the 
disciplinary knowledge, the semantics of the action with the semantics of the 
action’s intelligibility. 
The intersection of these two dichotomies enables us to identify four 
ideal-types of the way in which epistemological reflection can be used to 
clarify the relationship between the researcher and the object, a central 
problem common to the various proposed methods for action research. The 
reader should use the examples provided for each type with considerable 
caution. Classifications of authors and their contributions are almost always 
reductive and debatable. Ideal-types are useful in order to keep track of the 
virtually limitless variety of methodological approaches: but just as Weber’s 
ideal-type of bureaucracy is a concept having an empty extension, and which 
does not correspond to any concrete case (Weber, 1922), no theoretical 
approach and no actual application of action research can be clearly and 
exclusively placed in any one of the four solutions we have discussed. A 
detailed comparison of each concrete proposal with the ideal-types would be 
an interesting exercise, but would require a great deal of space. Here, we 
have limited ourselves to providing the reader with a compass so that he can 
begin to navigate the mare magnum of action research. 
The most frequently used solutions are still those with closer links to 
the objectivist and subjectivist conceptions of social science: a relational 
approach to studying social systems in general (and not just organizations) is 
still far less common, through there is no dearth of proposed methodologies 
and significant work that take such a direction. 
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The typology proposed here serves only as a schematic illustration of 
the many routes that have and can be taken, and is thus not intended to be 
prescriptive. Deciding which route to take is not a matter of chance, or 
simply a question of personal preference for one way of doing research 
rather than another. It is a choice that depends on many important premises: 
how we conceive our own relationship with social reality, the resources 
available to us and the constraints within which we move, our awareness of 
alternative routes, and so forth. From a general methodological standpoint, 
those who do empirical research, whatever their relationship with the 
investigated process may be, are first and foremost required to make choices 
that are consistent with their basic orientation: at the end of the day, this also 
entails value decisions, without necessarily having to make “activist” 
choices. In addition, while the truth concept does not apply to views of the 
organization, which thus all have equal dignity, we can nevertheless apply 
the concept of adequacy as regards the questions on the table. In the concrete 
situation, the subjects involved in action research must carefully evaluate 
whether the views that are taken and the resulting methodological choices 
are adequate for the goals that are to be attained. 
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